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COMMENTS
THE GEORGIA POWER CASE: ANOTHER
FEDERAL AGENCY COMES OF AGE, OR,
"MY GOD! OUR EMPLOYER-CLIENT'S
TESTING PRACTICES ARE BEING
CHALLENGED BY THE EEOC?!"
The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most
significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by their decisions than by those of all the
courts, review of administrative decisions apart. They also have
begun to have important consequences on personal rights...
They have become a veritablefourth branch of the Government,
which has deranged our three-branch legal theories as much as
the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our threedimensional thinking.

Justice Robert H. Jackson*

I.

PROLOGUE: THE EMPLOYER'S GROWING DILEMMA

Shortly after the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) came into existence,' one commentator remarked that the
new federal agency was nothing more than a "poor enfeebled
thing." 2 How things have changed since 1964! One very important
United States Supreme Court case,3 a number of Congressional
amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and a
* From Federal Trade Comm. v. Rubberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952).
I. Civil Rights Act or 1964 Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title Vii, 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C.
§§2000e to 2000e-15 (1970).
2. M. SOVFRN, LEGAl. RESTRAINTS ON RACIAl. DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 205

(1966).
3. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
4. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 107. As
originally enacted, Title VIi of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e15 (1970). prohibited discrimination in employment on grounds of race, color, religion, sex
and national origin. It created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which was
authori/id to receive charges of discrimination, to investigate such charges and, where it
had reasonable cause to believe a charge to be true, to attempt to eliminate the alleged
discriminatory employment practice by informal conciliation and persuasion. If conciliation
failed. the charging party was entitled to sue in federal district court. The process is de-

scribed in SOVERN,
102 (1966).

LEGAl. RESTRAINTS ON RACIAl. DIsCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

61-
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number of significant lower federal court cases, of which United
States v. Georgia Power Company'is one of the latest and perhaps
most significant, have all contributed to the development of a very
powerful federal agency. Since most of the judicial and Congression-al activity contributing to the increased clout of the EEOC has
occurred within just the last two to three years,' the precise nature
and full extent of the EEOC's new power remains unclear. However, there can be no question that the EEOC has changed from a
weak agency with limited powers of persuasion and investigation7
into a potentially very powerful enforcement mechanism' complete
with, what is in effect, substantive rule-making power.9 Further,
the EEOC has been given prosecutorial power originally reserved
to the Attorney General of the United States. 0 There are those
who contend that the EEOC has grown altogether too powerful,"
and it seems fair to observe that at least some of those associated
with the EEOC have become intoxicated with the agency's new
2
power.'
Certainly, discrimination of any sort is not to be encouraged,
but as this article will demonstrate the pendulum has now swung
too far in the direction of providing protection for the minority
employee, especially in the area of employment testing. While discrimination in hiring and promoting still exists and should be eliminated, the employer's rights must not be totally disregarded. The
growing power of the EEOC, particularly in the area of employment testing,' 3 has placed many of the nation's employers 4 in a
Among other things, the 1972 amendments to Title VII enable the EEOC to sue
private employers if conciliation fails, and gives the agency Jurisdiction over state and local
government employment. Also, the amendments preserve the individual claimants right to
sue.
5. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
6. The Griggs case was handed down in March of 1971.
7. Note I supra.
8. See TiHF EQUAl EiPi.OYNIENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 (BNA August, 1973), a
commentary published by the Editorial Board of the Bureau of National Affairs.
9. By virtue of the interpretation given to Griggs by some commentators. See notes 5658 infra. Cf discussion at 554-56 infra.
10. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (c) (1972).
II. See MINORITY REPORT OF THE HOUSE EDUCATION AND LABOR CoNiNITTEE RE'ORT ON H.R. 1746, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG., & AD. NEWS 2167, et seq.
12. Blunirosen, Strangers in Paradise; Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Eniplorntent Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972).
13. According to the EEOC GUIDELINES ON EMNPLOYEE SELECTION PROCEDURES, 29
C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1973), a "test" is defined as .... any paper-and-pencil or performance
measure used as a basis for any employment decision. The guidelines in this part apply, for
example, to ability tests which are designed to measure eligibility for hire, transfer, promotion, membership, training, referral or retention. This definition includes, but is not re-

19741

COMMENT

potentially exposed and virtually indefensible position. 5 By way of
introduction, it must be observed that the EEOC guidelines on
employment testing, which are to be found in the EEOC Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures 6 are quite difficult to understand 7 and almost impossible to apply.' 8 According to one commentary, the EEOC guidelines on employment testing,
. . . if applied literally . . . would raise the cost of testing for

many employers beyond tolerable limits, forcing the abandonment of testing programs which, although they may be valid,
cannot be validated at a tolerable cost. .

.

. In sum, the Guide-

lines appear designed to scare employers away from any objective standards which have a differential impact on minority
groups because, applied strictly, the testing requirements are
impossibl6 for many employers to follow. 9
It is significant that the above observation was made at a time
when the EEOC was still a comparatively "enfeebled" agency."0
After the United States Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke
Power Company,2 ' eliminated the requirement that a complainant
demonstrate that an employer intended to discriminate by using a
stricted to, measures of general intelligence, mental ability and learning ability; specific
intellectual abilities: mechanical, clerical and other aptitudes; dexterity and coordination;
knowledge and proficiency: occupational and other interests; and attitudes, personality or
temperament. The term "test" includes all formal, scored, quantified or standardized techniques of assessing job suitability including, in addition to the above, specific qualifying or
disqualifying personal history or background requirements, specific educational or work
history requirements, scored interviews, biographical information blanks, interviewers' rating scales, scored application forms. etc.
14. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1972) applies to employers with more than fifteen
em ployees.
15. Most of this article will be given over to a demonstration of the indefensible position
of the employer vis-a-vis the EEOC in the area of employment testing.
16. 29 C.F.R. Part 1607 (1973).
17. See Chance v. Bd. of Examiners of The City of New York, 330 F. Supp. 203, 220
(S.D. N.Y. 1971), where the court remarks on how reluctant the court is to "invade the
'"Cf. Comment,
profession characterized by an expertise not shared by us ...
Eniphqn'ent Discrimnation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L.
Ri-v. 1109, 1127-31 (1971) and Note, 1972 COLUO. L. REV. 900,905.See also, note37 infra.
18. See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 355 (5th Cir. 1972) and CCH
6329; Cf., Note, Civil Rights Law-FairEmployment Testing
EEOC Decisions (1973)
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 20 KANSAs L. REv. 334, 341 (1972); Also,
Comment. 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1127 and 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2144.
19. See, 84 HARV. L. REV., note 18 supra at 1131. In addition to being unclear, there
is considerable doubt as to the legitimacy of the guidelines. See discussion at 554-56 infra.
20. Certiorari had just been granted in Griggs at the time the comment in Harvard was
written. See 84 HARV. L. REv., note 19 supra at 1132 n.109.
21. Note 3 supra.
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particular testing procedure,22 employers discovered that even a
good faith effort to comply with the EEOC guidelines was far from
adequate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that:
• . .The problem is not whether the employer has willingly-

yea, even enthusiastically-taken steps to eliminate what it
recognizes to be traces or consequences of its prior pre-Act
segregation practices. Rather, the question is whether on this
record-and despite the efforts toward conscientious fulfillment
-the employer still has practices which violate the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended.2"
In addition to the fact that the Griggs case appeared to give a
substantive impact to the EEOC guidelines on employment testing,2 1 the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19642 gave to the EEOC quite extraordinary powers of enforcement. 2 ' Although it is entirely too early to determine exactly how
the EEOC will exercise this enforcement power, 27 indications are
that the EEOC will attempt to limit further the employer's possible
responses to the testing guidelines. For example, as the guidelines
are presently drafted, an employer not wishing to go to the trouble
and expense of validating an employment test which has a differential impact 2s on minority groups has the option of not only dropping that particular test but of discontinuing objective testing altogether.21 However, there is some evidence that the EEOC may be
moving in the direction of requiring that employers who administer
22. According to the Supreme Court in Griggs, note 3 supra at 432:
The Court of Appeals held that the Company had adopted the diploma and test
requirements without any 'intention to discriminate against Negro employees ... ,
We do not suggest that either the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred in
examining the employer's intent: but good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
"built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.
23. Rowe v. General Motors Corp., note 18 supra at 355.
24. See discussion at 528-32 infra.
25. Note 4 supra.
26. These powers are examined at 535-36 infra. Cf BNA commentary, note 8 supra.
27. For example, the prosecutorial powers derived from the Attorney General will not
ollicially vest -in the EEOC until March, 1974. See note 10 supra.
28. An employment test which adversely affects a higher proportion of blacks than
whites has a "differential impact" on blacks.
29. See Comment, Equal Opportunity-Griggsv. Duke Power Co., 6 SUFFOLK L. REv.
209, 215 (1971), to the effect that, because of Griggs, many companies have dropped
aptitude tests. Cf.Note, 17 VILL. L. REV. 147, 156 (1971).
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objective tests continue to do so.3 ° Indeed, there is even some
evidence that the EEOC may require employers not presently using
objective tests to begin administering such tests, if the agency concludes that they may be engaging in discriminatory hiring
practices.:"
Therefore, prior to United States v. Georgia Power
Company,3 2 employers who administered objective tests which
had a differential impact on minority groups found themselves
facing the unpleasant prospect of a costly challenge to their testing
procedures, irrespective of their good faith efforts to validate those
tests. Moreover, there was some uncertainty whether such employers could simply "give up the field" and stop administering objective tests altogether.3 3
The Georgia Power case promises both to strengthen the hand
of the EEOC and further frustrate the good faith efforts of the
employer who sincerely wishes to validate properly his objective
tests. Although extensively analyzed later in this article, the
Georgia Power case merits some preliminary comment. It is certainly not perfectly clear from a reading of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. that the Supreme Court intended to give the force and effect
of substantive law to all the EEOC guidelines on employment
testing, despite the fact that some commentators have read Griggs
as so providing.:" There is much that can be said in favor of not
giving the EEOC guidelines the force and effect of law; indeed, the
guidelines are very much in need of a complete reworking.35 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit blandly asserts that the EEOC guidelines on employment testing "should be followed absent a showing
30. See, for example, CCH Empl. Prac. Guide 5156 (EEOC March 27, 1973); Cf 1972
Coi.uMt. L. REv., note 17 supra at 924.
6328:
31. According to CCH EEOC Decision (1973)
Since Respondent's highly subjective hiring system has had a disproportionate
impact on minority group members, it is unlawful absent a showing of business
necessity. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra; and in light of Respondent's recent
record of discriminating against minority groups in several respects, as concluded
herein, it is essential that the system be objective in nature and be such as to permit
review.
32. Note 5 supra.
33. Of course, the employment test is a valuable tool whereby the employer can gain
some indication of how well an individual will discharge the responsibilities of a given job.
However, the more expensive the tool becomes, the more likely it is the employer will have
to forego using the employment test, no matter how useful. Cf 84 HARV. L. REv., note 19
supra at 1127 n.82.
34. Blumrosen, note 12 supra at 98.
35. See discussion 551-56 infra.
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that some cogent reason exists for noncompliance." 3
Aside from the fact that the Georgia Power case obviously
strengthens the hand of the EEOC, it creates some very serious
difficulties for the employer. Determining whether or not an employer's testing mechanism is in compliance with the EEOC guidelines on employment testing is an extremely difficult task.37 It
must be remembered that even though the Georgia Power Company had gone to the trouble and expense of hiring an industrial
psychologist to validate its employment tests, the Court of Appeals
held that the defendant had failed, and failed badly,38 to conform
its testing procedures to the EEOC guidelines."
How can a practitioner adequately advise an employer-client as
to his rights and duties under the EEOC guidelines? The Georgia
Power case raises the very real possibility that even advising an
employer-client to hire an industrial psychologist may prove inadequate. Unfortunately, there are no EEOC "approved" standard
employment tests:"' it seems clear, under the present guidelines,
that most employers will have to "validate"'" all examinations,
especially standard, commercial examinations, 2 themselves.
While the Georgia Power case occasioned this article, the commentary herein will not be limited to an analysis of the meaning
and impact of this single case. There is a definite paucity of
practice-oriented material on employment testing law as far as the
36. Georgia Power, note 5 supra at 913.
37. See discussion 544-51 infra. Regarding the difficulty of determining whether or not
an employer is testing in compliance with the EEOC guidelines, consider the following
candid observation contained in the majority report of the House Committee responsible
for drafting what finally became the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964:
It is increasingly obvious that the entire area of employment discrimination is
one v hose resolution requires not only expert assistance, but also the technical
perception that a problem exists in the lirst place, and that the system complained
of i, unlawful.
This kind of expertise normally does not reside in either the personnel or legal
arms of employers. . . .

1972 U.S. CODF CONG. & AD. NFws 2144.
38. The Court in Georgia Power described the company's efforts at validation as being
"irrelevant." Note 5 supra at 916-18.
39. See discussion 536-43 infra.
40. See STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAl. AND PSYCitOI.OGICAI. T-STS AND MANUAl S

(American Psychological Association 1966) STANDARDS C4.2, C4.9; but cf EEOC
G11I i INI 1607.7 at 29 C.F.R. Part 1607 (1973).
41. For articles discussing various theories of validation, see note 202 infra.
42. 84 HARV. L. RFv. note 19 supra at 1121. Cf Note, Intelligence Testing Beyond
Grqg, r. Due Power Co., 49 CIII.-KENT L. REv. 82-83 (1972).
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practitioner with an employer-client is concerned. This article provides the practitioner with some suggestions as to how to: 1)
Render adequate advice to his employer-clients as to their rights
and duties under the EEOC guidelines on testing, insofar as such
advice is possible under the present guidelines; and, 2) Discern
weaknesses and inadequacies in the present statutory and administrative matrix, as reinforced by a long line of federal court cases,
which the practitioner may be able to turn to a client's advantage
in a confrontation with the EEOC.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT STATUS OF EMPLOYMENT

TESTING LAW

A.

In the Beginning.
The law in this area really stems from a Congressional reaction
to the 1964 decision of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission in Myart v. Motorola, Inc.43 Many interpreted this
decision as banning any employment test which adversely affected
a minority group, irrespective of whether the test could be justified
on the basis of business need.44
During the Senate debate on the bill which was to become Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the proponents of the bill were
at pains to point out that the proposed Title VII would permit the
use of job-related" ' tests." However, a number of senators, led by
Senator Tower of Texas, feared that the Motorola case might be
used as precedent by the EEOC for the purpose of doing away with
any employment test which might have some adverse affect on a
minority group." The proponents of the bill argued that the
Motorola case could not be so used by the EEOC primarily because the EEOC did not have enforcement powers similar to those
of the Illinois FEPC:4 s i.e., the EEOC was to be equipped with only
43. Myart v. Motorola, Inc., II1. FEPC No. 636-27, reproduced in full at 110 CONG.
Ri:(-. 5662 (1964). iodifiedsub noui.. Motorola, Inc. v. FEPC, 58 L.R.R.M. 2573 (!11.Cir.
Ct. 1965). revd.. 34 III. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966).
44. Cooper & Sobel, Seniorit 'r and Testing Under FairEmployment Laws: A General
Ap roach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion,82 HARv. L. REV. 1598, 1649-54
(1969): see also. Note. Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in
Einployrnent and Edtcation. 68 CoI.uM. L. REv. 691, 707-10 (1968). Cf. discussion at 84
HARv. L. Ri:v., note 19supra, at 1123-26.
45. .See notes 97 & 98 infra and accompanying textual quotes.
46. 110 CONG. Rec. 13503-04 (1964).
47. Id. at 13492. Note Tower's remarks opposing quota system, id. at 9027, 13492.
48. Id. at 13504.
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limited powers of persuasion and investigation. 9 Senator Tower
was unconvinced. Senator Tower, therefore, introduced an amendment to Title VII which was intended to insure that employers
could use job-related employment tests in making decisions relating to hiring and promoting, even if such testing had an adverse
affect on a minority group.50 Senator Tower's amendment' passed
on a voice vote without debate and is now included in Section
703(h) of Title VII as follows:
. . [Nior shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test, its administration
or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 5
In responding to the above amendment both the EEOC and the
courts have relied heavily on the legislative history surrounding the
adoption of that amendment. Indeed, the decision in Griggs turned
on a determination of whether or not the EEOC had properly
divined the Congressional intent underlying Section 703(h).53
However, it is not at all clear just how helpful this legislative
5
history really iS.1
While it is fair to draw a negative inference from the legislative
history surrounding Section 703(h) that the Senators did not attempt to proscribe some system of "validating" an employment
test to insure that it's job-related [thus the Supreme Court's holding in Griggs that "the conclusion is inescapable that the EEOC's
construction of Section 703(h) to require that employment tests be
job related comports with congressional intent"], it does not follow
*

49. This situation has been altered by the 1972 amendments to Title VII. See discussion
535-36 infra.
50. Note 46 suqra at 13492: Tower's lirst amendment was rejected by the Senate. Note
46 .topra at 13505. Tower modified his amendment and, as modified, it passed. See note 51
inl/ra.

51. Note 46 supra at 13724. It seems clear that neither Tower amendment was meant
to give carte hlanche to use any test, regardless of its discriminatory effect or irrelevance
to productivity on the job. See 84 HARV. L. REv., note 19 supra at 1125 n. 72.
52. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (h) (1964).
53. Griggs. note 3 supra. passin.
54. According to 84 HARV. L. REv., note 19 supra at 1126:
The remarks are all, of course, somewhat ambiguous-and perhaps misleading-for there is no indication in the legislative history that the Senators ever conceived of the possibility that general intelligence tests may not be related to suitability
for hiring, or 'trainability.'
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that the detailed and complicated requirements of validation presently contained in the EEOC guidelines are in any way mandated
by the legislative history underlying Section 703(h), 55 nor does the
Supreme Court so hold in Griggs. Although some commentators," s
some courts" and even the EEOC itselP have read Griggs as
approving the EEOC guidelines in toto because consonant with the
intent of Congress, a central thesis in this article will be that Griggs
went only so far as to approve of the EEOC's interpretation of
Section 703(h) as requiring the use of job-related tests where a
minority group is adversely affected by a company's testing procedures.5' There is nothing in Griggs or in the legislative history
underlying Section 703(h) which can be read as obviating a challenge to any or all of the technical requirements of the EEOC
guidelines ori employment testing for any number of reasons.
B. The EEOC and the Administrative Response to and "Interpretation" of Section 703(h).
It is certainly true that the EEOC was born an "enfeebled"
agency. Of course, this was the will of Congress and not merely
the result of Congressional oversight."0 The EEOC was originally
empowered to undertake "technical" studies necessary to effectuate the purposes and policies of Title VII.11 Further, where a
charge of discrimination came to the attention of the EEOC, the
agency was given the authority to make a finding of reasonable
cause and thereafter to commence non-binding "conciliation" proceedings. 2 Finally, the EEOC was given the power to promulgate
3
certain proceduralregulations.1
Originally, the EEOC was not given the power to enforce the
provisions of Section 703(h). 4 If the EEOC attempt at conciliation
55. It seems that many of the aspects and potential ramifications of validation never
entered the minds of the congressmen responsible for Title VII.See 84 HARV. L. REv., note
19 supra at 1126.
56. Note. ('onstittional Law -Equal Protection-Employment Tests, 21 DE PAUL L.
Ruv. 580, 593 (1971): ef Blumrosen, note 12 supra at 96-99.
57. To a certain extent, the Georgia Power case does this. See discussion 536-43 infra.
58. CCH EEOC Decision (1973)
6329.
59. See, especially, discussion 528-32 infra.
60. Note 48 supra.
61. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (f) (5) (1970).
62. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (1970).
63. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1) (1964). It should be pointed out that this power has
not been expanded upon by Congress. See discussion at 537-38 infra.
64. As Senator Case, one of the co-sponsors of Title VII, stated: "Only a Federal court
would have the authority to determine whether or not a practice is in violation of the act
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failed, then either the complainant or the Attorney General-but
not the EEOC-could file suit in federal district court. 5 The
EEOC was not given, and to this day does not possess, statutory
authorization to issue substantive regulations.
Almost from the beginning, the EEOC strained to find ways
to exceed the Congressional limitations on the power of the
agency. 7 Professor Blumrosen, first EEOC Chief of Conciliations
and current agency consultant, recently described in great detail
early agency efforts to circumvent the Congressional limitations
originally placed on the EEOC's power.
After first asserting that many employers introduced employment tests in the early 1960's in order to avoid the full force and
effect of anti-discrimination laws, Professor Blumrosen describes
the great frustration felt within the agency relative to EEOC conciliation efforts, especially where discrimination was charged in the
area of employment testing.69 One particularly frustrating conciliation effort in 1966 was almost directly responsible for the formulation of the EEOC guidelines on employment testing. According to
Professor Blum rosen,
As we flew back to Washington, we reflected on the setback
we had just received. We concluded that further conciliation efforts concerning testing would be useless unless the Commission
published a clear, official statement delineating what the law
required. Without such official support, efforts at persuasion
would fail because of the employer's intense interest in retaining
his testing programs. We therefore decided to press within the
EEOC for the adoption of guidelines that would resolve the legal
questions concerning discriminatory testing. We encouraged disand only the court could enforce compliance." 110 CONG. REC. 7026 (1964). See also, Id.
-it 6205 and 12461-2.
65. BNA commentary, note 8 supra at 142.
66. Note 63 ,upra.
67. Perhaps it was simply inevitable that the EEOC would become a powerful agency,
since there seems to be, as some commentators have suggested, some sort of law at work
to the elect that a federal agency will naturally grow larger and more powerful with each
pa,,,,ing xcar. ('. Large. L Anlnt'bod)" Listening? The Problem of Access in Environmental
Litigatin. 1972 Wis. L. RFV. 62, 71-75.
68. Bluimrosen. Note 12 supra. Professor Blumrosen stated in an earlier article that the
-FOC ha', consciously sought to construe Title VII "as broadly as possible in order to
ma\im i/c the effect of the statute on employment discrimination without going back to
Congress for more substantive legislation." Blumrosen, Administrative Creativity: The
First Year of the Equal Emnployqent Opportunity Commission. 38 Gito. WAS|. L. Ri;v.
695. 7t2-(03 (1970).
69. Blumrosen, note 12 stqra at 60.
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cussions with the Offices of Research and Compliance and the
involvement of outside specialists in the testing field, and sought
the opinion of the EEOC's General Counsel. The Commissioners
and staff acted on our urging. As a result, the Commission issued
its guidelines on employment testing on August 24, 1966.
The guidelines represented the EEOC's interpretation of
Section 703(h) of Title VII [Emphasis supplied] ....
0
The requirements of the EEOC guidelines on employment testing have been the subject of extensive commentary. 7 ' While it is felt
72
that much of this commentary has, with certain reservations,
accurately described the content of these guidelines, insofar as
humanly possible, it is strenuously urged that few commentators
have taken to task the basic adequacy of these guidelines.7 3 The
adequacy, necessity and basic legitimacy of the present guidelines
will be commented upon at length later in this article.7 4 For the
moment, it will be sufficient to describe the manner in which and
the procedure by which the EEOC actually formulated and
adopted the guidelines on testing. Professor Blumrosen may again
be relied upon to supply the necessary information.
Since the authority to issue guidelines is based on the authority
to interpret Title VII, these guidelines are a fortiori 'interpretative' rules within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure
Act. As a consequence, no hearingor public participationin the
guideline-makingprocess is required. Therefore, in preparation
for the testing guidelines, the EEOC Office of Research called
together a group of testing experts, to whom Ken Holbert and I
explained the nature of the problem of discrimination with which
we were confronted, and asked them to prepare a statement.
That statement was later reviewed by the General Counsel and
his staff, and by the Commissioners before issuance.
The . . . guidelines constituted a Commission endorsement of
contemporary psychological testing standards developed by pro75
fessional associations [Emphasis supplied].
70. IdL at 60-61.
71. See authorities collected at note 202 infra.
72. Ie., as alluded to at 546 infra, although many commentaries have proved to be,
at the vcr) least. rather successful attempts to explain the various theories of validation, it
is perhaps inaccurate to say that they have been able to shed a great deal of light on the
l-l:OC testing guidelines. This latter observation holds especially true for the individual who
lacks a background in industrial psychology. See discussion at 545-47 infra, generally.
73. The comment at 84 HARV. L. REV., note 19 supra, is one notable exception.
74. See discussion at 551-56 infra.
75. Blumrosen. note 12 supra at 61, 97.
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Thus did the EEOC guidelines on employment testing come into
existence.
The lower federal courts initially reacted to the EEOC guidelines by pointing out that, while the EEOC could issue suitable
procedural regulations, the agency had no substantive rule-making
to appower 76 and that while the agency guidelines were entitled
77
propriate respect they were not conclusive on the courts.
With regard to any administrative rulings which the EEOC
made, however, at least one lower federal court held that they had
the force and effect of law 78 since the Congress had seen fit to
provide that good faith reliance on such rulings could be used by
an employer as an affirmative defense. 9 This latter decision notwithstanding, there is nothing to indicate that even the EEOC
seriously viewed the guidelines as having the force and effect of
law, t ' prior, of course, to Griggs v. Duke Power Company.
C.

The Griggs Mandate.
As with any landmark decision, the case of Griggs v. Duke
Power Company,"' has occasioned a great deal of commentary.82
Nevertheless, because Griggs is so fundamental to employment
testing law, and because it is felt that the case has frequently been
misread, a detailed analysis of Griggs would appear to be in order.
Thirteen incumbent Negro employees of the Duke Power Company commenced a class action against that company pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the company had openly discriminated on the basis of race in the hiring
83
and assigning of employees at the company's Dan River plant.
The Dan River plant was organized into five operating departments: (1) Labor, (2) Coal Handling, (3) Operations, (4) Maintenance, and (5) Laboratory and Testing. 4 Until August of 1966,
76. Dobbins v. Local 212, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413
(S.D. Ohio 1968).
77. International Chemical Workers Union v. Planters Manufacturing Co., 259 F.
Stipp. 365 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
78. Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227 (D.C. 1967).
79. Title 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-12 (b) (1964). Neither the holding in Hernandez nor the
general vitality of this section seem to have been compromised at all by either Griggs or
the 1972 amendments to title Vi1.
80. Even Blumrosen concedes this. Note 12 supra at 95 n. 143.
81. Note 3 supra.
82. Over lifteen law review articles have been written specifically on Griggs.
83. Griggs, note 3 supra at 426.
84. Id at 427.
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Negroes were employed only in the Labor Department.ss In 1955
the company initiated a policy making a high school degree mandatory for initial assignment to any of its departments except
Labor."s In 1965, when the company abandoned the policy of restricting Negroes only to the Labor Department, it extended the
high school education requirement to restrict transfer from Labor
to any other department to employees with a high school
education.81
The company added a further requirement for new employees
on July 2, 1965, the date on which Title VII became effective. To
qualify for placement in any department but the Labor Department it became necessary to register satisfactory scores on two
professionally prepared aptitude tests, as well as to have a high
school education."5 In September, 1965 the company began to permit incumbent employees who lacked a high school education to
qualify for transfer from Labor to an "inside" job by passing two
tests-the Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett Mechanical
Comprehension Test."s The Court in Griggs determined that neither of these tests were intended to measure the ability to learn or
perform a particular job or category of jobs." Also, the Supreme
Court noted that the EEOC in one case had found that use of a
battery of standardized tests, including the Wonderlic and Bennet
tests used by Duke, resulted in 58% of the whites passing the tests,
as compared with only 6% of the blacks."
85. I. at 427 n. 2.
86. Id. at 427.
87. I1.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 428.
The Wonderlie serves to measure the mental ability of adults for hiring and placement
in business and industry. The test is considered an economical and convenient instrument
but allegedly suffers from the fact that there has been inadequate correlation between
performance on the test and success in training for specific jobs (Basically the objection
raised by the plaintilrs in Griggs). See SIXTH MENTAL MEASUREMENT YEARBOOK (O. Buros
ed. 1965).
The Bennett test emphasizes, through the use of pictures about which short questions
are to be answered, the understanding of mechanical principles as applied to a wide variety
oreveryday lire situations. See A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 362-63 (ed. 1968).
Psyehologists have questioned the validity of tests such as the Wonderlic for years
(RF:CFNT DFVFzI".OENT, Civil Rights -Equal Employment Opportunity, 17 VII.. L. REv.
147. 156 (1971)). and therefore the specific holding in Griggs as to the Wonderlic and
Bennett tests did not shock too many people. However, the general implications of Griggs
%%creunsettling to a good many employers.
90). Griggs. note 3 supra at 428.
91. Il. at 430 n. 6.
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Before proceeding to a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs, it should be noted that the facts of that case strongly
suggest the existence of an actual discriminatory intent on the part
of the company in the use of the aptitude tests. For example, prior
to 1965, the Duke Company had an express policy of restricting
Negroes to the Labor Department." Also, the company first required that new employees take aptitude tests on the very same day
Title VII became effective. 3 Finally, the tests in question were
instituted on the judgment of the company that they would generally improve the overall quality of the work force: no meaningful
study of their relationship to job-performance ability was even
attempted.' The potential significance of these facts will be commented upon in a later section. 5
In Griggs, the Supreme Court specifically held that:
The [Civil Rights Act of 1964] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that arefair inform, but discriminatory
in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More than
that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing
that any requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question [Emphasis supplied].96
"The Court's holding is not complex, job-ability and employment
qualification tests must be reasonably related to the job for which
they are required." 7 Or, put another way, the "Griggs decision has
put to rest any question concerning the use of non-job-related general ability tests. Such tests are definitely prohibited by Title
V I.'"Jx
However, it is not at all clear what specifications employment
testing must meet in order to satisfy the job-relatedness standards 91 At least one commentator has gone so far as to assert that
92. Id. at 427.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 431.
95. See note 234 infra and accompanying textual comment.
96. Griggs, note 3 supra at 431-32.
97. 17 Viii_ L. REv., supra note 89 at 155.
98. See 20 KANSAS L. REV., note 18 supra at 341.
99. Id. (y Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Requirements of Title VII in Employee
Te.hing. Comment, 6 GEORGIA L. REV. 194, 202 (1971).
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the EEOC guidelines were adopted by the Supreme Court in
Griggs.'"" There is also an EEOC decision which declares that the
guidelines were approved in Griggs.'0 1 Of course, there is also the
Fifth Circuit's decision in the Georgia Power case which certainly
appears to acquiesce in the view that if Griggs did not adopt the
guidelines in toto, the Supreme Court nevertheless came quite
close to doing so. " "2
As was indicated earlier,11 a central thesis in this article is that
Griggs went only so far as to approve of the EEOC's interpretation
of Section 703(h) as requiring the use of job-related tests where a
minority group is adversely affected by a company's testing procedures. What follows is everything the Supreme Court had to say
relative to the EEOC guidelines in Griggs:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having
enforcement responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting
Sec. 703(h) to permit only the use ofjob-related tests. The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is
entitled to great deference . . .Since the Act and its legislative
history support the Commission's construction,this affords good
reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.
From the sum of legislative history relevant in this case, the
conclusion is inescapable that the EEOC's construction of Sec.
703(h) to require that employment tests be job-relatedcomports
with congressionalintent [Emphasis supplied].101
Above all, it must be remembered that the Court was responding
to a contention of the Duke Power Company, to the effect that
Section 703(h) specifically permitted the use of generalintelligence
tests unrelated to any job, when the Court made the foregoing
with respect to the EEOC's interpretation of Section
observations
703(h). ' ' I5
The entire thrust of the earlier part of the Griggs decision was
directed at establishing the validity of the requirement that any
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes is prohib100. 21 DiF PAWl, L. Rov., note 56 supra at 593.
101. Note 58 supra.
102. See discussion at 536-43 infra.
103. See 523 supra.
104. Griggs, note 3 supra at 433-34, 36.
105. The Court refers to this contention in the paragraph immediately preceding the
beginning of the excerpt from Griggs quoted in the text, which quote is referenced to note
104 supra.
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ited by Title VII if it cannot be shown to be related to job performance."'I The defendant, Duke Power Company, responded by arguing that Section 703(h) constituted, in effect, an exception to this
general rule." 7 This, in turn, forced the Supreme Court to examine
the legislative history underlying Section 703(h) to determine
whether or not the Congress had, in fact, intended that Section
703(h) constitute an exception to the general proposition that an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
allowed under Title VII unless job-related.'" 8 The Supreme Court
both begins"" and ends"" this examination of the legislative history
underlying Section 703(h) with a statement that the EEOC had
construed Section 703(h) to permit only the use of job-related tests.
In other words, the Supreme Court only uses the EEOC interpretation of Section 703(h) to buttress its own conclusion that Section
703(h) proscribes the use of tests which are not job-related (where
those tests adversely affect a minority group): the Court stopsfar
short of placing its unqualified imprimatur on the EEOC guidelines on testing. In order to strengthen both the authority of the
EEOC interpretation and, hence, the validity of the Court's conclusion with respect to Section 703(h), the Court cites authority for
the long-established doctrine that a good deal of weight is to be
given to the construction put upon an act by an enforcing agency."'
With the aid of the EEOC construction of Section 703(h) as permitting only the use of job-related tests, and by virtue of its own
analysis of the legislative history underlying Section 703(h), the
Supreme Court concludes that the defendant's contention (that
Section 703(h) stands as an exception to the general proposition
that employment practices which operate to exclude Negroes are
not allowed under Title VII unless job-related) must fail."'
Given the ambiguous nature of the Court's assertion that the
guidelines express the will of Congress," 3 and in view of the
106. Note 96 vitpra and accompanying textual quote.
107. Note 105 squlra.
108. See discussion at 521-23 supra; cf discussion in Griggs, note 3 supra at 433-36.
109. Griggs, note 3 .stpra at 433.
110. Id. at 436.
I1l. I.L at 434.
112. Id. at 436.
113. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court makes the statement that there is "good
reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress." Griggs at 434. One must,
hos\ever. lirst consider the act that the Court only makes this one reference to the relationship bet%%een the EEOC guidelines and legislative history: beyond this one reference, the
Court speaks only of the correctness of the EEOC's 'interpretation' or 'construction' of
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Court's quite apparently limited intention in the latter part of
Griggs simply to rebut the defendant's contention" 4 relative to
Section 703(h), there is little reason to infer a judicial intention on
the part of the Supreme Court to adopt in toto the EEOC guidelines on testing. Had the Court intended to impart the force and
effect of law to the EEOC guidelines, it seems altogether unlikely
that they would have used anything but the clearest and most
unmistakable language. This conclusion follows with even greater
force when one remembers that the EEOC testing guidelines are
of a highly detailed and technical nature.'t 5 Does it not seem likely
that the United States Supreme Court would have examined, to
some extent, the content of those guidelines, or at least made some
passing reference as to why the Court approved of that content,
before the Supreme Court placed its unqualified imprimatur on
those guidelines?
While it is at least arguable that the Supreme Court in Griggs
approved of the EEOC's issuance of interpretative guidelines indicating the application of Title VII to general classes of situations,"' there is nothing in Griggs or in the legislative history
underlying Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which
can be read as obviating a challenge to any or all of the technical
requirements of the EEOC guidelines for any number of reasons."'
It is, of course, recognized that there are those who are of the
opinion that the Supreme Court adopted or approved all of the
EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures in Griggs, at
least to some extent." s The above analysis of the Griggs case
Section 703 (h)to the efect that that section is intended to permit the use of only job-related
tests. Griggs at 433-36.
114. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., discussion at 549-51 infra.
116. Blumrosen, note 12 supra at 95.
117. As to some of the challenges which might be made to the EEOC testing guidelines,
see discussion at 549-56 infra.
118. See notes 56-58 supra.
Professor Blumrosen views Griggs as giving an extraordinary amount of substantive
weight to the EEOC guidelines on testing. According to Blumrosen:
The process used by the Supreme Court in determining the validity of EEOC
guidelines involves a search through the legislative history for a clear demonstration
that the EEOC interpretation was not intended. If the matter isambiguous or if the
legislative history supports the interpretation of the EEOC, the Griggs analysis
requires that the district courts follow the guidelines [Emphasis supplied].
Blunrosen. note 12 supra at 98-99.
Professor Blumrosen's remark that the above analysis "confers great responsibility on the
EEOC [Blumrosen. note 12 supra at 991. .." is somewhat of an understatement. It would
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should, however, provide the practitioner who must advise and
defend employer-clients with the wherewithal to resist the growing "' tendency to read Griggs as foreclosing challenges to the
guidelines. In this regard, the practitioner may wish to argue, as
one commentator has suggested,' that the guidelines may be incorporated into the common law on an ad hoc basis, thus allowing
for a careful examination of the individual guidelines in the context
of cases to which they are applicable. If the practitioner were to
employ this latter argument, he should stress the fact that Griggs
did not analyze the content of the guidelines, thus lessening the
chances that the court will raise a strong presumption in favor of
the guidelines' validity.'' Much more will be said with respect to
various challenges which the practitioner may make to the guidelines in a later section of this article. 22
A detailed analysis of the Griggs decision necessitates an examination of the various other aspects of the Supreme Court's holding
in that case. Indeed, as has been suggested already, the Supreme
Court's discussion of Section 703(h) is almost incidental to its
primary holding regarding the general thrust' of Title VII. In
other words, it is only because the defendant contended that Section 703(h) constituted an exception to the general purpose and
requirements of Title V II121 that the Supreme Court was then
forced to address itself to the legislative history underlying Section
703(h) in order to demonstrate that all that it had said with respect
to Title VII generally was equally applicable to Section 703(h).' 5
be more correct to point out, especially in view of the analysis of Griggs offered at 528-33
of the text, that Blumrosen's above analysis confers upon the EEOC unwarranted (and
illegal: see discussion at 554-56 infra) substantive rulemaking power.
119. See discussion of Georgia Power case at 536-43 infra.
120. 1972 Coi ut. L. Ri:v., note 17 supra at 920. This commentary represents a dissent
from those %lho read Griggs as approving of the testing guidelines because of Congressional
hiltor%. After discussing the Griggs treatment of the EEOC guidelines, this commentary
concludes:

. . .ITjhere isno evidence that Congress intended to give the EEOC regulations the
status of law. To give them that status would effectively deprive the courts of the
authorit% to interpret Title VII. Hence the proper function of the guidelines is to
serve as non-hinding aid to the court.
1972 COLUNI. L. REV., note 17 supra at 920. As a subsequent discussion (551-56 infra)
deniontrates (here are arguments against relying too heavily on the guidelines even if they
are trealed ;is
nothing more than "an aid to the court."
121. The Georgia Power case seems to raise such a strong presumption. See discussion
at 536-43 infra.
122. See discussion at 551-56 infra.
123. Note 96 vulrt and accompanying textual quote.
124. Note 107 vlpra.
125. See note 105 supra and discussion at 530-31 supra, generally.
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The primary holding in Griggs2 ' may be broken down into
three component parts. If an employment practice'27 is (1)shown
to have an adverse impact on a minority group, and (2) the practice
cannot be justified on the basis of business necessity (i.e., if the
practice cannot be shown to be related to job performance), then
(3) irrespective of the employer's motivation, the practice is proscribed. Each of these component parts will be analyzed in view
of what the Supreme Court said in Griggs and in view of what
courts and commentators have said since Griggs.
(I) Since the Court in Griggs failed to indicate just how much
of a discriminatory impact had to be demonstrated before Title
VII guarantees could be triggered, this aspect of the Court's decision has occasioned a good deal of post-decision discussion. One
writer has extensively analyzed the type of statistical evidence that
must be brought forward by a plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination and his discussion is recommended to the
practitioner. 2 At least one commentator has suggested that where
there is slight or no evidence of a discriminatory impact, then the
use of any objective standard would be valid. 2 1 In this regard, a
1968 district court case held that a discrepancy of five to ten percent between the scores of blacks and whites taking a test is not
3
suflicient to show discrimination. 0
(2) The Court in Griggs seems to have clearly rejected any
loose or subjective measure of "business necessity" by requiring
that any device or mechanism used to select or transfer employees
must be "demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance."' t: However, once a business necessity has been established,
there is case law to the effect that employment statistics [tending
to show a discriminatory effect] cannot be used alone to outweight
132
a defendant's evidence of business necessity.
The Fourth Circuit added an interesting twist to the concept of
business necessity.
126. Note 123 supra.
127. Which would include, but obviously would not be limited to, employment testing.
128. 1972 Coi.u'i. L. Ri-v., note 17 supra at 909-23; cf. Blumrosen, note 12 supra at
91-92.
129. 6 GFORGIA L. Riiv., note 99 supra at 201 n. 49.
130. United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 78 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
131. Griggs note 3 supra at 436: cf. Blumrosen, note 12 supra at 82. It should be
remembered that, in the area of employment testing, business necessity is determined by
the conducting of a validation study. See discussion of validity at 547-48 infra.
132. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 446 (5th Cir. 1971).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

.. . [Tjhe business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to
override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and
there must be availableno acceptablealternativepolicies orpractices which would better accomplish the business pt~rpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential
33
racial impact [Emphasis supplied].'

The italicized portion of the above quote represents an extension
of Griggs."' It appears that the EEOC now applies this analysis
of business necessity to employment testing. 135 More particularly,
consider the following from a 1971 EEOC decision:
. . . flIf there is a reasonablealternative method of achieving the

same goal, i.e., the safe and efficient operation of the Tool Planner job, which alternative has a lesser impact on minority groups
than the test, then the use of the test is arbitrary,3i.e.,
unneces6
sary, and therefore unlawful [Emphasis supplied].1

(3) If nothing else is clear in Griggs, it is clear that the employer can be found to have violated Title VII irrespective of
whether or not he intended to do so." 7 If an employment practice
has a discriminatory effect, and if that practice cannot be justified
on the basis of business necessity, then the practice is prohibited,
no matter the good faith efforts of the employer to blunt the dis:
criminatory effect.1
It may not be technically correct to say that Griggs has placed
the employer under a burden of strict liability. 39 Nevertheless, in
view of the Fourth Circuit's stringent test for business necessity
and its requirement that a demonstrated business necessity will still
be insufficient if there is an alternative method of achieving the
same business purpose,"' the employer's burden certainly comes
very near to being one of strict liability.
Before concluding this analysis of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,

the practitioner with employer-clients is reminded that the em133. Robinson v. Lorrilard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). cert. denied. 404 U.S.
1(106 (1971): c[. Rowe v. General Motors Corp., note l8supra at 354; Johnson v. Pike Corp.
of America, 332 F. Supp. 490, 495-96 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
134. (Q1. Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implications for Private and Public
I:n'mphtrer%. 50 TFXAs L. R,.v. 901, 914 n. 92 (1972).
135. Note 58 supra.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

hL 1at
4588.
Note 23 supra and accompanying textual quote.
Griggs, note 3 supra at 431.
See. e.g., Blumrosen, note 12 supra at 71-72.
Note 133 ,%upra and accompanying textual quote.
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plover has a very heavy burden of proof under Griggs, indeed.
". Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing
that any given [testing] requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question [Emphasis supplied]."''
D.

The 1972 Amendments to Title VII: The EEOC "'Arrives"
The decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. greatly encouraged
the EEOC,"2 since the agency read this decision as approving the
EEOC Guidlines on Employee Selection Procedures.' In other
words, the EEOC saw the guidelines as more than mere procedural
interpretations after Griggs, which conclusion has undoubtedly
been greatly reinforced by the Georgia Power case. 4
While it can be strongly argued that the EEOC's interpretation
as to the Griggs impact on the guidelines is very largely the product
of wishful thinking, 5 there can be absolutely no doubt that the
agency received some very real power in 1972.
The original powers granted to the EEOC under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have already been described. 4 According to the Majority Report of the House Education and Labor
Committee on H.R. 1746, the bill which eventually resulted in the
1972 amendments to Title VII:
H.R. 1746 remedies the failure to include effective enforcement
powers in Title VI I by enacting a new Section 706 (Section 4 of
the bill) which empowers the Commission, after it has exhausted
the procedures for achieving voluntary compliance, to issue complaints and hold hearings . . . and to seek enforcement of its
orders in the Federal Courts. "7
In addition to the aforementioned powers, two years from the
effective date of the 1972 amendments, March 24, 1972, all the
141. Griggs, note 3 supra at 432.
142. Blumrosen. note 12 supra. passhn.
143. Note 58 stra.
144. See discussion at 536-43 infra.
145. According to Professor Blumrosen:
The decision has poured decisive content into a previously vacuous conception of
human rights. It shapes the statutory concept of'discrimination' in light of the social
and economic facts of our society. The decision restricts employers from translating
the social and economic subjugation of minorities into a denial of employment
opportunity, and makes practical a prompt and effective nationwide assault by both
administrative agencies and the courts on patterns of discrimination.
Blumrosen. note 12 supra at 62.
146. See discussion at 523-26 supra.
147. MAJORITY REPORT OF T-E HOUSE OF EDUCATION AND LABOR CO,.MITTFE ON
H.R. 1746. 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2145.
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United States Attorney General's prosecutorial powers relative to
pattern or practice discrimination will be transferred to the
EEOC. ' s Also, the 1972 amendments expanded the EEOC's jurisdiction to employees of state governments and to employers with
more than 15 employees.'
The 1972 amendments do not preclude the right of private
litigants to commence an action under Title VII.5t 0 Also, it is important to note that the 1972 amendments do not in any way alter
the provision of Title VII which specifies that the EEOC "shall
have authority from time to time to issue, amend, or rescind
suitable procedural regulations [Emphasis supplied] ... .
Because the 1972 amendments to Title VII are of such recent
vintage, it is too early to determine just how the EEOC will exercise its new enforcement powers. However, the new enforcement
powers, coupled with the EEOC's firm conviction that its testing
guidelines have considerable substantive weight, should make for
a very aggressive agency, especially in the area of employment
testing.
E. United States v. Georgia Power Company: and the Agency's
Power Keeps on Coming.
As mentioned previously, it is felt that the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Georgia Power Company' will tend both
to strengthen the hand of the EEOC and further frustrate the good
faith efforts of the employer who sincerely wishes to properly validate his objective tests. A careful analysis of the Georgia Power
case should demonstrate the correctness of this observation.
The Georgia Power Company was charged with a great deal
more than just discriminatory testing. In addition to two private
class actions, the Attorney General of the United States had
commenced a "pattern or practice" suit against the company alleging that the company had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory
53
behavior for a number of years.
As of December 25, 1970, only 543 of the company's 7515
employees were black (7.2%) despite the existence of a large pool
148. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1972).

149.: For a detailed discussion of the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. ,ee BNA commentary, note 8 supra, passin.
150. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 () (I) (1972).
151. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (a). See discussion at 554-56 infra.
152. Georgia Power note 5 supra.
153. Georgia Power note 5 supra at 910.
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of black applicants for positions.' 5' Until July 29, 1963, an open
and unvarying policy of the company prevented black persons from
competing for any but the most menial and low-paying jobs within
the corporate structure.'
Though the formal prohibition of black advancement and
transfer to traditionally white jobs was terminated in 1963, little
statistical difference in job placements of blacks had occurred by
January 10, 1969, when the Attorney General filed suit against
Georgia Power.' Beginning in 1960, all new employees were required to have high school diplomas, and beginning on August 19,
1963, all new employees were in addition required to pass a battery
of tests developed by the Psychological Corporation. 157 On November 19, 1964, the educational and testing requirements were suspended for hirees into the laborer classification upon agreement by
them not to progressfurther in the company without meeting those
requirements."I

As was necessary in the foregoing analysis of Griggs,159 it must
be pointed out that the facts of this case strongly suggest the existence of an actual discriminatory intent on the part of the Georgia
Power Company in the use of its aptitude tests. In addition to the
obvious, past discriminatory tendencies of the company, it must be
remembered that tests were first used for screening job applicants
on August 19, 1963, less than one month after the discontinuation
of formal job segregation. 160 Further, the tests were initiated without anV prior study of their ability to predict likelihood of successful job performance, and the first formal attempt to validate them
came shortly after the Attorney General's filing of the "pattern or
practice" suit.' The potential significance of these facts will be
62
commented upon in a later section.
A significant difference between Griggs and the Georgia Power
case centers about the fact that, while in Griggs the company made
no effort to prove that its tests were related to job performance,
154. Id.
155. 1&
156. /d. at 911.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See p. 528 supra.
160. Georgia Power. note 5 supra at 912; ef the District Court's Findings or Fact Nos.
40-45, United States; v. Georgia Power Company, 3 EPD 8318 (N.D. Ga. 1971) at 708384.
161. Georgia Power, note 5 supra at 912.
162. ('. note 95 siipra See note 234 infra and accompanying textual comment.
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the Georgia Power Company acknowledged its Griggs burden to
validate the tests it had used and attempted to carry that burden
with extensive expert opinion evidence (the Hite Study).'" : The
Georgia Power Company introduced a mass of statistical data,
developed by an industrial psychologist, by which the company
sought to prove "a demonstrable relationship between test scores
and job performance."'6 4 Dr. Hite, the company's industrial psychologist, decided to conduct a validation study employing what
is known as "concurrent validation (a process in which a representative sample of current employees is rated, then tested and their
scores are compared to their job ratings)."'6 '
The District Court found that, while the testing procedures of
the Georgia Power Company did not meet the EEOC validation
requirements,', nevertheless,
• . .the testing program used by Georgia Power Company is of
significant help to the Company in predicting the job performance of applicants for employment and promotion, inasmuch as
it has been demonstrated that there is a positive correlation between test results and job performance."
In finding for the company, the lower court was obviously swayed
by the testimony of the government's experts that there is no test
known or available which could meet the EEOC requirements, and
that it would take at least two years for a company to develop a
testing program to meet all the EEOC criteria for validity. 8 At
one point, the lower court describes this testimony by the government's experts as "rather startling."' Accordingly, the District
Court held that:
In connection with the tests, they are 'professionally developed'. They were 'adopted after meaningful study of their relationship to job performance ability' long before the Act [i.e., the
Civil Rights Act of 1964] was effective. They are 'predictive of
or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior comprising or relevant to the job. . . .' They have been
validated in a professional manner. . . .By no means are they
163. Georgia Power, note 5 supra at 912.
164. Id. at 911.
165. I

at 912.

166. Georgia Power District Court opinion, note 160 supra at 7086, Finding of Fact
No. 63.

167. hl at 7086. Finding of Fact No. 63.
168. Id.
169. Id at 7092 n. 8.
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perfect. Hopefully, future studies and developments in the field
ofpsychological testing will produce a program even more meaningful to all employees, black and white. A t present, however,for
the reasons stated they are deemed permissible and not a practice
in violation of the Act [Emphasis supplied].170

Before proceeding to an analysis of the Court of Appeals decision in this case, some attention should be given to the critical
response occasioned by the District Court opinion, prior to the
decision rendered on appeal. According to one commentator,
If the decision in Georgia Power is reversed and employers
are required to conform their test requirements to the EEOC
standards and if the testimony in Georgia Power that no test
known today can conform to those standards is correct, then all
emplo'inent testing will be unlawful. If the decision is not reversed, courts must decide each case upon the evidence presented. Validity will be a reasonable, not an absolute, standard ....
The EEOC standards are concededly very rigid, and, as
pointed out in Georgia Power, their enforcement could lead to a
7
complete prohibition of testing [Emphasis supplied].' '

One other writer points out that the plaintiffs appealed from the
District Court's decision in Georgia Power on the ground that,
because of the EEOC's greater expertise in the area of testing, the
72
guidelines should be the applicable standard.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision in Georgia Power, at least in
effect.' 7 "' The unanimous decision of the three Judges who heard
170. hd at 7092: the decision of the District Court in Georgia Power is consonant with
that of the holding in the Porter case, note 130 supra.
171. 20 KANSAS L. Ri-v., note 18 supra at 342-43.
172. 1972 COLUM. L. REV., note 17 supra at 919-20.
173. The Court concludes its discussion of Georgia Power's testing practices and attempts at validation by pointing out [Georgia Power, note 5 supra at 917-18] that:
We conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law in relying on the Hite
Stud% to find that Georgia Power had met the burden of manifesting its tests were
joh-related ....
Moreover. standards for testing validity comprise a new and complicated area of the
la%%.
While the lite Study did not demonstrate compliance with the Act, we hesitate
to penali/c this litigant, the first to confront such a demanding burden of proof, for
f1ailing to introduce a more rigorous study ... Therefore. rather thani nowproscribing theteing pr( gram which Georgia Power hav used, we remand this phase of the
Ce to the trial court with directions to permit the company a reasonably prompt
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the appeal undertook a most detailed analysis of Dr. Hite's validation study, applying to that study the technical requirements of the
EEOC testing guidelines.
At the outset, it must be admitted that the Court of Appeals
levels some very valid criticism at Dr. Hite's study. however, it is
strenuously urged that the validation efforts of Dr. Hite could have
been successfully taken to task without recourse to and blanket
approval of the technical requirements of the EEOC guidelines.
In the first place, the Court makes the determination that the
validation study conducted by Dr. Hite was, in fact, irrelevant to
the testing procedures actually employed by the Georgia Power
Company.' 7' This determination, which should have pretermitted
any necessity of evaluating Hite's study in terms of the validation
requirements of the EEOC, seems entirely valid. In fact, Dr. Hite
even admitted that "I made no study of the Company's method
whatsoever."'

75

Notwithstanding the Court of Appeal's determination that Dr.
Hite's study was irrelevant to the actual testing practices of the
company, the Court proceeds to analyze Hite's study in terms of
the validation requirements contained in the EEOC guidelines on
testing. This analysis accords the guidelines a great deal of weight,
despite some very persuasive evidence that called into question the
basic premises of those guidelines. For example, the Court concludes that the employer must, in compliance with EEOC Guideline 1607.5(b)(5), establish differential validity where technically
feasible. 7 This means that the employer must generate data and
report results separately for minority and nonminority groups.'77
An American Psychological Association sanctioned report declares:
This hypothesis, that test scores have different meanings for different subgroups, requires extensive research for confirmation or
rejection; existing evidence is inadequate to determine whether
aptitude tests actually discriminate unfairly because of their different validities from one subgroup to another.'7 8
OpportuitIr to validate the testing program applied to plaintifll. in accordance with
the principlcs enunciated in this opinion [Emphasis supplied].
174. (orgia
Power. note 5 supra at 916-17.
175. Id.
170. The full
cite to this guideline is 29 C.F.R. 1607.5 (b) (5) (1973).
177. Id.
178. Georgia Power, note 5 supra at 914 n. 8.
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Despite this report's conclusion as to differential validity (which
conclusion the Court of Appeals quotes in a footnote), and despite
the potential expense to which employers would be put by requiring
such differential validation, the Court mechanically declares "Certainly the safest validation method is that which conforms with the
EEOC guidelines."' v
The Court of Appeals in Georgia Power does concede that the
EEOC guidelines " . . . must not be interpreted or applied so
rigidly as to cease functioning as a guide and [thus] become an
absolute mandate or proscription."' 8 However, this caveat stands
in stark contrast to the extreme deference shown to the guidelines
by the Court, both in its analysis of the Hite study and in its
ultimate holding. Again, after observing that Hite's use of concurrent validation had deprived him of an opportunity to evaluate the
performance of many applicants who failed to become part of the
current workforce, the Court of Appeals takes Dr. Hite to task for
not "attempting to supply this deficiency through ad hoc evaluation of probationary employees or the use of validity studies from
other organizations with comparable jobs, as permitted by Sec.
1606.7 [sic: the correct cite is 1607.7].'"181 The Court does not even
mention the potential expense which might be involved for many
employers in hiring probationary employees. Further, the Court
doesn't even consider the possibility that such a practice might
defeat the very business necessity which may have prompted an
employer to adopt a particular employment test in the first place:
e.g., the need to insure that an employee is capable of recognizing
the potential danger the performance of his job may hold for fellow
employees.
As to the requirement of EEOC Guideline 1607.7, allowing for
the use of validity studies from other organizations with comparable jobs, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has failed to recognize
the very real contradiction between the guidelines on testing and
the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals, 182 which Standards are expressly approved by the EEOC
179. hU at 914.
180. /d. at 915.
181. Id. at 916.
182. Prepared by a joint committee of the American Psychological Association, American Educational Research Association and National Council on Measurement in Education
in 1966. A copy of the Standards is on file in the Marquette Law Review Office, 1103 West
Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233.
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Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures."" The Standards
strongly suggest that "'validity is specific' and must always be
interpreted for a particular setting in which 'the test user himself
must evaluate and integrate all of the data available to him.' "184
It is not that the use of validity studies from other organizations
with comparable jobs is bad,' 85 it is just that the Court of Appeals
in Georgia Power fails to examine this apparent inconsistency between the guidelines and the Standards upon which those guidelines so heavily rely, and to judicially assess the potential implica186
tions of this unexplained inconsistency.
After undertaking their extensive, albeit unnecessary,'87 evaluation of Dr. Hite's study in terms of the EEOC guidelines, the three
presiding Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reached the conclusion that:
This requirement to treat the guidelines as expressing Congressional intent obviously was intended as an answer to the
question at issue in Griggs-when can tests, which are shown to
have discriminatory results, be used? We view the reference by
the Griggs court to EEOC guidelines as an adjunct to the ultimate conclusion that such tests must be demonstrated to be job
related. We do not read Griggs as requiring compliance by every
employer with each technical form of validation procedure set
out in 29 C.F.R, Part 1607. Nevertheless, these guidelines undeniably provide a valid framework for determining whether a validation study manifests that a particular test predicts reasonable
job suitability. Their guidance value is such that we hold they
should be followed absent a showing that some cogent reason
exists for noncompliance [Emphasis supplied].' 8
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (a) (1973).
184. The comment following STANDARD C4.2 of the STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAl
AND)Ps ('1101 O(;ICAI TFSTS AND MANUALS, note 182 supra, provides that:
One manual for an aptitude battery presents a great variety of test-criterion
correlations. It states that even though the large amount of test-criterion data pre\,ented nay be confusing to the user, it is nevertheless necessary since 'validity is
,pecilic" and must always be interpreted for a particular setting in which 'the test
u,,er
himself must evaluate and integrate all of the data available to him.'
185. Indeed, this is one of the strong points of the testing guidelines. See suggestion No.
4 at 550-51 infra.
186. Of course. it is altogether possible that the Court never saw these Standards (there
i\no indication in the Court's opinion), since the Standards are not widely available. See
discussion at 545-46 infra.
187. Lnnecessary because of the Court's conclusion that Hite's Study was irrelevant to
the actual testing practices of Georgia Power. See discussion at 540 supra.
188. Georgia Power, note 5 supra at 913. To fully
understand the Fifth Circuit's deci%ion in Georgia[Power, one must recall the holding of an earlier case decided in the Fifth
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It is certainly true that the Court of Appeals in Georgia Power
does not denominate the EEOC testing guidelines substantive law.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals clearly recognizes that the Supreme Court only made a reference to the EEOC guidelines, which
reference was incidental to the High Court's primary holding that
employment practices which have an adverse effect on minority
groups must be job-related 89
However, both by the great deference with which it treats the
guidelines on testing in analyzing the Hite study and by its requirement that the guidelines be followed absent some cogent reason for
noncompliance, the Court of Appeals in Georgia Power has given
the EEOC guidelines on testing unprecedented substantive weight.
It may now be expected that the EEOC, given its new enforcement
powers and demonstrated zeal,' will make life quite unpleasant
for employers, especially in light of the Fifth Circuit's failure to
recognize the possibility that, depending upon the degree' of demonstrated discrimination, all employers should not be held to the
same standard of compliance. Most of all, however, the Fifth Circuit should be faulted for not examining the degree to which the
guidelines really do "provide a valid framework for determining
whether a validation study manifests that a particular test predicts
reasonable job suitability."'9 2 It is not enough to declare that the
guidelines undeniably provide such a valid framework.
Finally, it is unfortunate that the Court of Appeals does not
qualify its criticism of the Hite study with some recognition of the
wisdom of retaining an industrial psychologist. One is left with the
unfortunate, though perhaps justified, feeling that nothing will help
Circuit. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Company, 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971).
Griggs demands more substantial proof, most often positive empirical evidence, of
the relationship between test scores and job performance. . . . Certainly the safest
validation method is that which conforms with the EEOC Guidelines 'expressing the
will of Congress.' .See [Griggs] [Emphasis supplied] ....
Jacksonville terminal at 456.
It is apparent that the Fifth Circuit has seized on the Supreme Court's remark that the
EEOC guidelines "express the will of Congress" as the basis for concluding that each of
the detailed and technical requirements that the guidelines set out for validation should be
ignored by the employer only at his peril: "Certainly the safest validation method is that
which conforms with the EEOC guidelines." Therefore, even before Georgia Power, the
:ifth Circuit had interpreted Griggs as imparting substantive weight to the EEOC guidelines
on employment testing.
189. See discussion at 529-32 supra.
190. E.g., Blumrosen, note 12 supra. passin.
191. See notes 128-30 supra and accompanying text.
192. Georgia Power, note 5 supra at 913.
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an employer comply with the guidelines on testing, not even an
industrial psychologist.
Ill.

WHAT THE PRACTITIONER CAN

DO

EIPI.OYER-CIolENTS COMPLY WITH THE

TO INSURE THAT His

EEOC GUIDELINES ON

TESTING

For the practitioner who is considering advising his clients himsell" in this area, the following suggestion is in order: don't. Unless
the practitioner is an industrial psychologist, he will probably find
the EEOC guidelines on testing and closely related Standards for
Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals nearly incomprehensible. For example, EEOC Guideline 1607.5(a) specifies
that:
For the purpose of satisfying the requirements of this part [i.e.,
the part setting forth the minimum standards for validation],
empirical evidence in support of a test's validity must be based
on studies employing generally accepted procedures for determining criterion-related validity, such as those described in
'Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and
Manuals' published by the American Psychological Association
193

When one turns to the A.P.A. Standards, however, he finds the
following caveat:
These standards are intended to guide test development and reporting. A great deal of the information to be reported about
tests is technical, and therefore the wording of the standards is
of necessity technical. They should be meaningful to readers who
have training approximately equivalent to a level between the
master's degree and the doctorate in education or psychology at
a superior institution of higher learning. 94
They aren't kidding! The difficulty of understanding the guidelines
and related Standards has not been underplayed in the least.,'" Of
course, this is one very good reason for objecting to the EEOC
guidelines on testing as presently drafted, which problem will receive attention in the last section of this article. For the present,
however, the concern is with keeping the employer-client out of
difficulty, given the guidelines as they presently stand.
193. 29 C.F.R. s 1607.5 (a) (1973).
194. STANDARiS. note 182 supra at p. 5.
195. (/. authorities collected at note 17 supra.

19741

COMMENT

In view of the fact that an employer can be found in violation
of Title VII irrespective of his good faith efforts to comply with
the requirements of the law, 9 ' it is tempting to suggest that the
employer should do nothing at all. That is, the employer should
wait for the EEOC to come forward and tell him what is necessary
to be found in compliance with the law. This approach may not
be as unwise as it might appear on first blush. Before the EEOC
can sue an employer,9 7 it must "endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by98 informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuation."'
If the practitioner is unwilling to wait to find out if a particular
testing procedure is in compliance with the guidelines, he may seek
technical assistance pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-4 (g)
(3), which provision provides that the Commission shall have
power to "furnish to persons subject to this [Title] such technical
assistance as they may request to further their compliance with this
[Title] or an order issued thereunder; . . ." Any resulting, written
guidance provided an employer by the EEOC can be used as an
affirmative defense in any action commenced against the employer, if "he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance
on any written interpretation or opinion of the Commission
If the practitioner fails to receive satisfactory guidance from
the EEOC, 2 "1 it would still be wise for him to avoid rendering
advice to a client himself. The implications of Georgia Power notwithstanding, the practitioner should seek the assistance of an in196. Note 23 spra and accompanying textual quote.
197. The EEOC's failure to sue does not preclude the possibility of private suit. See
note 150 supra.
198. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (b) (1972).
199. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (b) (1964).
200. This would appear to be an increasingly significant possibility in view of the
1EOC's increased responsibilities under the 1972 amendments to Title VII. In this regard,
.%ee Minority Report of criticism of H.R. 1746, note I I supra at 2167-72. According to the
BNA commentary, note 8 supra at 3:
The broadening or its jurisdiction and enforcement powers poses many problems
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In the current fiscal year, the
for tile
Commission already has had a case intake ofabout 33,000. It was 22,000 in the 1971
liscal year. The Commission is about 22 months behind in its processing of cases.
With the Commission's new enforcement powers, these problems will be compounded. It will be necessary to hire and train new attorneys to handle the litigation
in the rederal courts. And it will be necessary to have competent and trained investigators to prepare eases for trial in the courts.
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dustrial psychologist. Of course, for the practitioner with smaller
clients, 2 1 it simply may not be feasible to retain an industrial psychologist. In this event, the practitioner will have to educate himself in the ways of validation, a la the EEOC guidlines, if his clients
are to receive any advice at all.
There have been a number of rather successful attempts to
explain the various theories of validation, and the commentaries
containing these successful attempts should be consulted by the
practitioner.2 "2 Unfortunately, however, the practitioner will probably find that these commentaries help little in understanding and
applying the EEOC guidelines on testing. 0 3 It may be possible to
understand the guidelines better by studying the Standards for
Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals, which are referred to in EEOC Guideline 1607.5 (a). However, the practitioner
will probably find that these Standards are not all that easy to
understand."" Further, the requirements of the Standards often
conflict with those of the EEOC guidelines.0 5
While it may seem safest to advise a client simply to discontinue an objectionable testing practice, or, perhaps, to discontinue
objective testing altogether, the practitioner is reminded that it is
201. After the 1972 amendments to Title VII, employers with as few as lifteen employecs are affected by the Act. See note 14 supra.
2(12. 1972 Cot ust. L. REv., note 17 supra at 913-14, 84 HARV. L. Rpv., note 19 supra
at 1119-23: Bernhardt, note 134 supra at 902-06.
203. Consider the following excerpt from 84 HARV. L. REv., note 19 supra at 1121-22,
%%hich provides one of the clearer expositions of the fundamental aspects of the validation
concept.
Since the utility of tests often is not self-evident, professional psychologists point
out that a test should he 'validated,' to insure that a high statistical correlation exists
between test results and performance on the job in question. That is to say, the
employer must make sure that the test is a good predictor of productivity. There is
a hierarchy of validation techniques according to rigor of methodology and accuracy
of result. Two main categories of validation are common: 'empirical' and 'rational.'
Psychologists generally prefer empirical validation studies, and among these the ideal
approach is that of 'predictive,' or 'classical,' validation. Predictive validation involves first a professional assessment of what a job requires, a thoroughgoing 'job
analysis.' The diverse factors considered include character, personality, and ability.
The next step relates the results of the test to actual criteria of successful job
performance. The employer would administer the test to 100 applicants, hire them
all regardless of test scores and without further screening. They then would be given
equally cogent instruction and equally congenial supervision. If after some period of
time the test scores correlate signilicantly with job performance, the test has been
'validated.'
Cf. discussion infra at 549-50.
204. See note 194 supra and accompanying textual quote.
205. See notes 184-86 suqpra and accompanying text.
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not at all clear whether or not this course of action would prove
08
satisfactory to the EEOC.
IV.

WHAT

To Do

WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR A SHOWDOWN

The practitioner's employer-client may have grown rather fond
of his testing mechanism. Moreover, he may be of the opinion that,
while it may have an adverse impact on minority groups, his testing
mechanism does a better job of measuring the man for the job than
any economically feasible alternative. If the EEOC disagrees, or
if any member of a minority group disagrees, the client better be
prepared to demonstrate that his testing mechanism is "valid." It
has been said that a "test is valid to the extent that those who
perform well on the test tend to perform better on the job." 0 7 In
other words, the employer-client must demonstrate that the test is
job-related.
The employer-client has no choice: he must establish that his
testing mechanism bears "a manifest relationship to the employment in question," if that mechanism has an adverse impact on
minority groups. 0' , The United States Supreme Court has so decreed and this article does not pretend to counsel otherwise. Indeed, it is perfectly just that an employer be required to come
forward with proof that an employment test, which has an adverse
impact on minority groups, is being used for some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory purpose.
However, the employer has a right, by Federal Statute as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, to use objective tests
which have an adverse effect on a minority group if he can establish
a business necessity for those tests, that is, if he can establish that
they "are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance." 1 No federal agency is vested with the power to short-circuit
a Congressional or Supreme Court mandate, not even the EEOC.
Therefore, to the extent that the EEOC's Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures tend to frustrate the employer's right to use
objective tests, pursuant to the Congressional mandate contained
in Section 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
interpreted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the basic thrust of the
practitioner's defense strategy becomes clear.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Notes 30 and 31 supra.
1972 Coi um'. L. Rrv., note 17 supra at 913. Cf. note 203 supra.
Griggs. note 3 stqra at 432.
hi. at 436.
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In all probability, a practitioner will begin planning his defense
of an employer-client's testing procedures in earnest rather late in
the day. Therefore, the practitioner will probably have the benefit
of a detailed explanation from the EEOC (which should be furnished during the mandatory conciliation conference) as to the
reasons why the agency finds the employer's testing procedures
objectionable.
As has been suggested, 10 since the employer can be found in
violation of Title VII irrespective of his good faith efforts at compliance, an employer may simply want to "sit tight" and wait for
the EEOC to tell him what must be done to put his testing practices
in compliance with the EEOC guidelines. Then, if the EEOC
makes unreasonable demands on the employer, the practitioner
can begin to ready a defense. This approach may be especially
appealing to the small or medium size employer, since he may
avoid the trouble and expense of validation altogether.2 1 1 Inorder
to avoid some sort of punitive reaction in the courts, 21 2 this approach should be taken only if the practitioner is quite certain that
the employer's testing procedures aren't patently questionable;
i.e.., the practitioner should have some good reasons for concluding that the employer's testing mechanism: (1) does reasonably
relate to job performance; and (2) does not flagrantly discriminate
against a minority group.
If the practitioner honestly feels that the employer's testing
procedures may be of a questionable nature, or if the practitioner
represents a large, high-profile employer, it would seem unwise to
await a challenge from the EEOC before undertaking an examination of the employer's testing procedures. As in any other area, the
best defense is preparation.
For the small or medium sized employer, the practitioner will
probably have to bear the responsibility for attempting to validate
a questionable testing procedure. The practitioner who represents
a large employer-client should seek to retain an industrial psychologist. Since it is felt that a practitioner with large clients should
not even attempt to validate testing procedures himself,2 13 the
210. See discussion at 544-45 supra.
211. With the greatly increased enforcement powers of the EEOC (ef note 200 supra),
it will in all likelihood become most dillicult for the EEOC to police all employers in the
nation. Of course, there will always be the problem of private complainants.
212. See the powers conferred on federal courts at Title42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1972).
213. For one thing, there isjust too much at stake. For another, the larger theemployer,
the more detailed the statistical analyses and the more complicated the graphical presenta-
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suggestions which follow are primarily directed at the practitioner
with small or medium size employer-clients.
A. La 'ing the Groundwork of a Defense-Making the Effort to
Validate
The employer should make the effort to validate according to
the requirements of the EEOC guidelines on testing. To ignore the
guidelines would be to invite difficulty. Further, not all the guidelines on testing are difficult to understand or apply.
If the practitioner is of the opinion that the employer-client's
testing procedures have a substantial adverse impact on a minority
group,211 the time has come to validate those procedures by demonstrating that those who perform well on the employer's tests tend
2t 5
to perform btter on the job.
The precise validation efforts necessary will depend on the type
of testing procedures used by, and the general circumstances of, the
employer. However, there are some general suggestions which may
prove useful in undertaking a validation effort.
I. Be certain that there is no reasonable alternative to the
suspect testing procedures. 216 If the practitioner can find a reasonable alternative to a testing procedure, which alternative has less of
an adverse impact on minority groups, the employer would do well
to save himself the trouble and expense of validation and adopt the
alternative.
2. Make the effort to become as familiar as possible with the
EEOC guidelines on testing and the Standards for Educational and
Psychological Tests and Manuals. This will not be easy, but the
practitioner should try.
3. Do not overlook complying with the easy, commonsense
requirements of the guidelines and Standards. For example, EEOC
Guideline 1607.5(b)(2) requires that:
tions. as a matter or course. It must be stressed again, however, that hiring an industrial
psychologist is not necessarily the whole answer. See discussion at 543 supra;cf.29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.8 (h) (1972).
214. See Porter, note 130 supra and accompanying text.
215. Note 207 supra.
216. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1973); Cf.notes 133-36 supra and accompanying text. Be
careful or alternatives which may result in the discontinuation of objective testing in effect.
See note 30 supra and textual comment. Also, there may be a temptation to employ a quota
s stem. This temptation should be resisted because of the colorblind provision of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 6) (1970): Cf.84 HARV. L. REv., note 19 supra at 1114-18. But see
United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lath. Inc., 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Tests must be administered and scored under controlled and
standardized conditions, with proper safeguards to protect the
security of test scores...
4. In representing the smaller client, don't forget that EEOC
Guideline 1607.7 is a safety valve device for the smaller employer.
This guideline provides that:
In cases where the validity of a test cannot be determined
pursuant to Sec. 1607.4 and Sec. 1607.5 (e.g., the number of
subjects is less than that required for a technically adequate validation study, or an appropriate criterion measure cannot be developed), evidence from validity studies conducted in other organizations, such as that reported in test manuals and professional literature, may be considered acceptable when: (a) the
studies pertain to jobs which are comparable (i.e., have basically
the same task elements), and (b) there are no major differences
in contextual variables or sample composition which are likely
to significantly affect validity. Any person citing evidence from
other validity studies as evidence of test validity for his own must
substantiate in detail . . . comparability and must demonstrate
the absence of contextual or sample differences cited in paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section [Emphasis supplied].
The words which have been italicized in the above Guideline demonstrate that the small employer who seeks to use validity studies
conducted in other organizations will have to come forward with
a good deal more than his opinion that the jobs which are the
subject of these studies are comparable to the jobs in his company.
5. The practitioner should not feel that just because his test
is professionally developed or approved he does not have to validate. The guidelines on testing specifically provide that "Under no
circumstances will the general reputation of a test, its author or its
publisher, or casual reports of test utility be accepted in lieu of
2 17
evidence of validity.1
6. The Standards suggest that validity studies should be, from
time to time, updated.' 8 It cannot be said with any certainty how
often, but every time a new job is added or the requirements of a
job change, it would seem that a new validity study would be in
2 1
order (naturally, this could prove to be a little expensive). 1
7. As to the more technical requirements of the EEOC guide217. 29 C.FR. § 1607.8 (a) (1972).
STANDARDS, note 182 supra
219. I. at STANDARD C6.7.

218.

at

STANDARD

C6.71.
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lines and the Standards, without acquiring a rather extensive
knowledge of industrial psychology (which would probably prove
somewhat hard on the client's pocketbook), 2 it is difficult to see
how the practitioner will be able to comply with the requirement
that "The presentation of the results of a validation study must
include graphical and statistical representations of the relation,,21 or how the practiships between the test and the criteria .
such as "validity
tioner will be able to correctly apply concepts
''2
coetlicients" or "reliability coefficients. 1
Not only are these concepts difficult to understand, they are
also diflicult and expensive to apply. 2 3 It is at this point, where
the employer (it no longer matters whether large or small) concludes that the trouble and expense of validation in accordance
with the EEOC guidelines on testing is not worth it but is nevertheless reluctant to give up what he sees as a valid testing device, that
a showdown with the EEOC may become inevitable.
B. Protecting the Client's Testing Program from Unreasonable
Guidelines.
If the EEOC (or a private litigant) forces the issue with regard
to what appears to be the unreasonable requirements of a particular testing guideine, the first step in preparing a defense will involve
demonstrating the guidelines' general vulnerability to attack. The
foregoing analyses of the legislative history underlying Section
703(h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,224 Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. 2 2 '1 and United States v. Georgia Power
Conpan, 22' should greatly aid the practitioner in establishing that
the technical requirements of the EEOC Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures are hardly inviolate. In this regard, the practitioner will want to stress that part of the holding in Georgia
Power to the effect that the guidelines on testing are not to be
22(0. There may very well he those attorneys who will specialize in this area of the law.
Of course. this won't solve the problem of expensive validation procedures. Further, this
fact won't have much signilicance to the practitioner with small clients who could not afford
to hire a specialist in any event.
The practitioner with small employers should not forget the possibility ofseeking technical assistance from the EEOC. See discussion at 544-46 supra.
221. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6 (1972).
222. STANDARDS, note 182 supra at parts C & D.
223. See notes 17-19 and 171 supra.
224. See discussion at 520-23 supra.
225. See discussion at 526-35 supra.
226. See discussion at 536-43 supra.
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treated as an absolute mandate or proscription.227 At the same
time, he must emphasize the fact that the absence of any analysis
of the guidelines' content in Griggs"' strongly militates against
reading the Fifth Circuit's requirement that the guidelines "should
be followed absent a showing that some cogent reason exists for
noncompliance""' as giving rise to a strong presumption in favor
of the adequacy, necessity or legitimacy of the guidelines.
The next step in preparing the employer-client's defense will
involve developing a challenge directed at the adequacy or necessity of the guidelines which the employer finds objectionable.
Examples of some challenges which might be directed at certain
of the guidelines have already been given earlier in this article.23:"
Actually, any particular challenge will almost certainly be generated by economic considerations, 2 I and thus the specifics of any
such challenge will depend on the specific problems which an
employer-client has encountered in attempting to comply with a
certain testing guideline.
There are, however, some general considerations which should
not be overlooked in preparing such a challenge. Even the EEOC,
in at least one decision, has recognized that:
This is not to say that there is no limit to the expense that Title
VII requires an employer to incur in seeking reasonable alternatives to present employment criteria which operate to exclude
minority groups. Obviously, however, the level of reasonable
expense would increase in direct proportion to the extent of the

inpact (here five times as great on Negroes as on Caucasians)
and the number ofjobs involved (here 321 positions at the facility
along) [Emphasis supplied]. 32
The italicized words from the above EEOC decision 33 provide
the basis for arguing that the stringency of the guidelines should
be moderated in direct proportion to the extent that a testing procedure actually excludes or adversely affects minority groups. It
would seem fair to argue that the further a client's case is from the
227. Note 180 .tqlrat.
228. See discussion at 530-31 supra.
229. Note 188 .tqpra and accompanying textual quote.
230. See discussion at 540-43 above.
231. E.g., the cost of updating test validation efforts every time the requirements of a
particular job are changed. See notes 218-19 supra.
232. Note 58 supyra at 4590.
233. Recall that good faith reliance on a ruling or other written interpretation of the
E[OC mnay constitute an allirmative defense. See notes 78-79 supra.

19741

COMMENT

fact situations found in Griggs and Georgia Power234 the weaker
the guidelines' mandate should become. That is to say, while the
ittent to discriminate in the use of a testing procedure is now
irrelevant under Griggs,215 the extent to which the client's procedure adversely affects a minority group is still a highly apposite
consideration.
Another consideration which should not be underplayed in preparing a challenge to the adequacy or necessity of a guideline
centers about the fact that "At its best testing is not a highly
developed science, and it rarely reaches its best." 236 If the practitioner has had to undertake validation studies himself, his ability
to turn this fact to his client's favor will depend on the extent to
which the practitioner has been able to familiarize himself with the
science of industrial psychology. If the practitioner is fortunate
enough to have the services of an industrial psychologist in preparing the client's defense, the practitioner should press the psychologist to research viable alternatives to the requirements of the
EEOC guidelines. Test validation is hardly an exact or welldeveloped science.2 :17 Less expensive and less complicated alternatives to the guidelines should be strongly urged on the court, even
though arguably less accurate than the more stringent guidelines.
Certainly, the greater the discriminatory impact of a testing
procedure, the higher the degree of accuracy which should be demanded of a validation study. Two points should be made, however: (1) the converse should hold true (i.e., the lighter the discriminatory impact of a testing procedure, the lower the degree of accuracy which should be demanded of a validation study); and (2) the
fact that the EEOC testing guidelines are expensive and difficult
to implement does not make them, ipsofacto, accurate validation
devices.
The final step in preparing an employer-client's defense will
involve developing a challenge directed at the basic legitimacy of
the EEOC guidelines. The present article was written as a negative
response to the growing tendency to accord the EEOC Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures the judicial respect usually reserved for regularly adopted, substantive mandates. In point of
234. See notes 95 & 162 supra and accompanying textual comments.
235. Notes 137-38 supra.
236. 1972 CouMi. L. REV., note 17 supra at 900; cf.49 CH.-KENT L. REV. at 83 &
84.
237. Barrett. Gray Areas in Black and White Testing, 46 HARV. Bus. REV. 92 (1968).
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fact, Congress has clearly specified that the EEOC "shall have
authority from time to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable
procedural regulations." ' :" This congressional limitation on the
rule-making power of the EEOC was in effect at the time the
guidelines were first adopted. Further, the 1972 amendments to
Title VII did not alter this Congressional limitation on the
agency s power.
If the EEOC guidelines on testing are now to be treated as
having substantive weight, then two things should happen: (1) Congress should amend Title VII so as to provide the EEOC with
substantive rule-making authority; and (2) the agency should be
required to withdraw its testing guidelines pending the proper
adoption thereof. Of course, the practitioner can do very little to
bring about a Congressional amendment to Title VII. However,
irrespective of whether or not Congress acts, if the guidelines on
testing are to be treated as de facto substantive rules, then the
practitioner should strenuously urge the court to compel the EEOC
to withdraw its testing guidelines due to the EEOC's failure to
adopt those guidelines, ab initio, in accordance with Title 5 U.S.C.
Sec. 553.
As Professor Blumrosen candidly admits," ' no hearing or public participation in the guideline-making process occurred when the
guidelines were originally formulated by the EEOC. As long as
these guidelines remain mere interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of the agency, 240 then there is no violation
of the Administrative Procedure Act.24 ' However, the EEOC
guidelines on testing are increasingly taking on the color of substantive mandates. This tendency will undoubtedly become more
pronounced as the EEOC begins to fully exercise its new enforce212
ment powers.
238. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (a) (1964).
239. Note 75 supra and accompanying textual quote. See note 247 infra.
240. Even if merely "guidelines," the language of the Supreme Court in Skidmore v.
Sxi ft & Co.. 323 U.S. 134. 140 (1944) should be kept in mind.
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validit. of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all thosle Factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
241. Title 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (3) (A) (1967).
242. See discussion at 556-57 infra.
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are designed to assure fairness and mature consideration of agency regulations that are of general application. 4 Further, the Supreme
Court has held that the rule-making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act may not be avoided by an agency, even though
a particular regulation is the product of an adjudicatory proceeding. 2" Finally, at least one federal court has held that when a
proposed administrative agency regulation of general applicability
has a substantial impact on the regulated industry, or an important
class of the members or the products of that industry, then the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553,
2 45
should be complied with.
As Profe~sor Blumrosen admits, instead of giving public notice
of the EEOC's intentions and then allowing interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule-making process through submission of written data, views or arguments, as required by the
Administrative Procedure Act where substantive rules are concerned,2 11 the EEOC held no hearings and allowed for no public
participation in the guideline-making process. 247 According to Pro243. N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
244. Id.
245. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (Del. 1970).
246. Title 5 U.S.C. § 553 (c).
247. Note 75 supra and accompanying textual quote.
As this article was going to press, the EEOC was apparently beginning to take
some limited steps to conform its guidelines on testing to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act for substantive administrative rules. While they have
not withdrawn their Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures set forth in Part
1607 of 29 C.F.R., nevertheless, the EEOC has solicited comments on their testing
guidelines from psychologists, federal contractors and minority group organizations.
however, no indicaCCH Empl. Prac. Guide 1 5186 (EEOC Oct. 4, 1973). There is,
tion that the EEOC has solicited comments from employers subject to the guidelines
on testing or that the EEOC intends to hold any substantial public hearings on the
guidelines. Further, there is no guarantee that the EEOC will radically alter their
present guidelines on testing or that they will be receptive to suggestions from all
psychologists or from the employers who must conform with the guidelines.
Since there is no indication to be found anywhere as to the nature of any proposed
changes in the guidelines, as a result of the comments presently being solicited [the
guidelines reproduced at CCH Empl. Prac. Guide 1 5186 (Oct. 4, 1973), which guidelines are to be the basis of the solicited comments, are really no different from the
present guidelines found at 29 C.F.R. 1607], a series of phone calls were made in
early 1974 to officials of the EEOC in Washington, D.C. Those officials indicated
that any revisions in the guidelines would be a long time in coming.
It must also be noted that, even assuming the EEOC does take some limited steps
in the direction of conforming their guidelines to the requirements of the Administra-
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fessor Blumrosen, the EEOC only "encouraged discussions with
the [agency] Offices of Research and Compliance and the involvement of outside specialists in the testing field, and sought the opinion of the EEOC's General Counsel."248 What outside specialists
were approached? How thorough was the consideration given to
each of the many different and conflicting theories of test validation? Where is the input from the regulated employers? '9 The
adverse affect that an inadequate validation scheme might have on
the very right of an employer to use employment tests can easily
be appreciated. Therefore, if the EEOC testing guidelines are to
have any substantive weight they should be, at minimum, adopted
in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act's requirement that a prerequisite to the adoption of a substantive agency
rule is the holding of public hearings.
V.

EPILOGUE:

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THAT "POOR
ENFEEBLED THING"?

Yes, things certainly have changed since the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission first came into existence back in
1964. No one can seriously argue that the EEOC should be without
at least some enforcement powers. Economic discrimination is
wrong and must be eliminated as quickly as possible. As both the
1972 amendments to Title VII and the overall judicial reaction to
the EEOC demonstrate, however, there is no reason to fear that
the EEOC will be deprived of the necessary enforcement machinery. Moreover, the demonstrated zeal of the EEOC should dispel
any doubts as to the willingness of the agency vigorously to seek
the eradication of employment discrimination. In fact, the EEOC
is carrying out its enforcement efforts with the vigor of the righteously indignant."' Unfortunately, the righteously indignant, while
pursuing an obvious good, sometimes fail to distinguish between
what is wrong and what only appears to be wrong.
One sometimes gets the impression that the EEOC is of the
opinion that if, in destroying employment discrimination, it must
ti'e Procedure Act land any revisions based on the limited solicitation of comments
contained in CCH Eimpl. Prac. Guide 5186 (Oct. 4,1973) would constitute only a
limited compliance with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act],
there still
remains the fact that the EEOC has never been vested by the Congress
%ith substantive rule making power in the first place.
248. Note 70 sitpra.
249. See note 247 supra.
250. See Blumrosen, note 12 supra. passhn.
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destroy the employer's right to use employment tests, then so be
it. If this is, indeed, the attitude of the EEOC, and the extreme
stringency of the EEOC testing guidelines almost forces the conclusion that this is the agency's attitude, then the EEOC clearly
stands in violation of the law. The Congress, in Section 703(h) of
Title VII, has clearly given the employer the right to use
employment tests (which may, unfortunately but necessarily, have
a differential impact on a minority group), providing only that the
employer can demonstrate that the tests are clearly job-related.
The United States Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power
Companyr, did not, in fact or in effect, abrogate Section 703(h).
Employment tests, even if they have an unfortunate albeit unavoidable discriminatory impact, are fully consonant with Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, because, as the Supreme
Court said in Griggs, "the very purpose of Title VII is to promote
hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis
of race or color [Emphasis supplied]. ' 2 1' All that needs to be
shown, relative to such employment tests, is that they "measure the
person for the job and not the person in the abstract, ' ' 2 i.e., the
tests must be job-related.
The 1972 amendments to Title VII have equipped the EEOC
with some very real enforcement powers. 2 5 The EEOC has grown
quite powerful, indeed. However, when the judges in Georgia
Power accepted the contention of the plaintiffs2 4 that, because of
the EEOC's greater expertise in the area of testing, the EEOC
guidelines should be the applicable standard for validation, absent
some cogent reason to the contrary, the Fifth Circuit became the
latest contributor to the false impression so many have of the
testing guidelines as substantive law. It is time to put the illconceived and unrealistically demanding testing requirements of
the EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures in proper
perspective.
WILLIAM

251.
252.
253.
254.

Griggs, note 3 supra at 434.
hL at 436.
See discussion at 533-36 supra.
1972 Co u'i. L. RFV., note 17 supra at 920.
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